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Abstract
The paper presents a theoretical analysis of macroeconomic eﬀects of the
payroll tax. Workers pay the income tax and the fee for the social security.
Firms also bear the payroll tax and the social security contribution for em-
ployed workers. However, in Japan, firms do not have to pay for the payroll
tax and the social security contribution for non-regular workers. The labour
cost of non-regular workers is much smaller than that of regular workers.
This is the main reason why firms have increased non-regular employment
since 1990s. The paper examines the macroeconomic eﬀects when the def-
erence in the labour costs between regular workers and non-regular workers
becomes smaller. More precisely, the case when the government decreases the
payroll tax for regular employment and the case when government introduces
the payroll tax for non-regular employment are investigated.
Keywords: payroll tax, non-regular employment, regular employment,
JEL classification: H24, H25, J31, J64, J68
∗The Okuma School of Public Management, Waseda University, 1—6-1 Nishi-Waseda, Shinjuku-
ku, Tokyo, Japan Phone: +81-3-3207-0096; Fax: +81-3-3207-3186; E-mail: flipfuku@waseda.jp
1
1 Introduction
Japan has experienced a sharp rise in non-regular employment. The share of non-
regular workers has been increasing from 20% in 1990 to 34% in 2007(Ministry of
Health, Labour andWelfare, 2006, 2007). Firms are achieving employment flexibility
through increased hiring of non-regular workers, i.e. part-time workers, temporary
staﬀs, contract workers etc. These workers are boosting their share of employment.
From the macroeconomic point of view, a rise in the share of non-regular workers
makes the Japanese labour market more flexible. However, for workers, a rise in the
share of non-regular employment implies that employment situation becomes less
stable.
The main reason why firms increase non-regular employment is that the labour
costs of non-regular workers are relatively inexpensive. The average hourly wage
of part-time employees, who account for three-quarters of non-regular workers, is
only 40% of that of regular workers. In addition to the hourly wage, non-regular
workers are not paid the bonus that firms pay to regular workers. Firms do not
have to bear the social security contribution for non-regular workers such as pen-
sion insurance, medical care insurance, and employment insurance. Moreover, in
general, non-regular workers are not eligible for a paid holiday and a maternity
leave. Namely, compared with regular workers, non-regular workers are less expen-
sive labour for firms. However, if the share of non-regular workers who are not
well paid is continuously increased, this will bring about serious problems for the
Japanese economy/society in the future. An increase in non-regular workers will
incur both a shortage of labour and a decline in labor productivity. As a result,
international competitiveness inevitably will fall and economic growth will stop in
the long-run. Moreover a decrease in regular workers will have negative impacts on
the social welfare system and the risk of a collapse of the social welfare system will
increase.
There are also serious equity problems, given that the diﬀerence in productivity
between regular and non-regular workers is much smaller than the wage gap. The
equity concern is magnified by the lack of movement between the two segments
of the workforce, trapping a significant portion of the labour force in a low-wage
category from which it is diﬃcult to escape. The main obstacle between the two
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segments comes from the diﬀerence in the labour costs. The paper investigates
the macroeconomic eﬀects when the labour costs between regular workers and non-
regular workers become smaller. More precisely, the paper analyses the general
equilibrium eﬀects of the payroll taxes that firms don’t have to pay for non-regular
employment in Japan. I investigate the following two cases: (1) the case when the
government decreases the payroll tax for regular employment; and (2) the case when
the government introduces the payroll tax for non-regular employment.
Fitoussi(2000) surveys the macroeconomic eﬀects of payroll tax reductions for low
paid workers. He shows the relationships among the payroll tax, the minimum wage,
and the employment subsidy. He concludes that a rise in the wage subsidy reduces
the burden of the payroll tax for firms and also increases low-paid employment.
Goerke(2000, 2002) used an eﬃciency wage model to study the macroeconomic
eﬀects when the payroll tax is replaced the income tax. He shows that a shift from
payroll to income taxes will reduce unemployment if the tax level is held constant
at the initial wage.
This paper uses a two-sector general equilibrium model. I rely on the idea that
wages and employment are determined by the intersection of an employment and
a wage-setting schedule (Layard et al., 1991; Calmfors, 1994; Fukushima, 1998,
2001, 2003). I study the macroeconomic eﬀects of a change in the payroll tax.
The next section of the paper sets the basic model. In Section 3, first, I shall
investigate the eﬀects of a change in the payroll tax in the regular job sector when
the payroll tax is not levied in the non-regular job sector. Second, the case when
the government introduces the payroll tax in the non-regular job sector is analysed.
Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
I consider an economy consisting of two competitive sectors: a high-productivity
sector with regular employment (sector 1) and a low-productivity sector with non-
regular employment (sector 2). A worker can find himself in one of the following four
states: (1) regular employment; (2) non-regular employment; (3) unemployment in
the regular job sector; and (4) unemployment in the non-regular job sector.
I shall assume that payroll taxes are levied on the wage bill. Wages and employ-
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Figure 1: Labour market flows
ment are determined by the intersection of an employment schedule and a wage-
setting schedule. A Nash bargaining model of the same type as in Manning (1993)
is used to define a wage-setting relationship in sector 1. The wage in sector 2 is
given by a legislated minimum wage.
2.1 Labour market flows and stocks
The various stocks and flows of labour are summarised in Figure 1. I assume that
the economy finds itself in a steady state and thus, that all stocks are constant.
Moreover, I postulate a stationary total labour force, which is normalised to unity.
Individuals leave the labour market at a constant rate a, which is exactly the
same rate as the rate of entry into the labour market. A fraction xa of new entrants
is assumed to enter the unemployment pool in sector 1 and search for a regular job.
A fraction 1−xa of new entrants is assumed to search for a non-regular job in sector
2.
The share of unemployed workers in sector 2 is u2. They find a job with the
probability s2. The steady state condition for unemployment in sector 2 is
(a+ s2)u2 = q2n2 + (1− xa) a, (1)
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where q2 is the exogenously given quit rate from non-regular employment. The
LHS is the outflow from unemployment and the RHS is the inflow into non-regular
unemployment.
The steady state condition for non-regular employment (n2) is
(a+ h+ q2)n2 = s2u2, (2)
where h is the exogenously given transfer rate from sector 2 to sector 1. I assume
that only non-regular employed worker can move from the non-regular job sector
(sector 2) to the regular job sector (sector 1). The LHS is the outflow from non-
regular employment and the RHS is the inflow into non-regular employment from
the non-regular unemployment pool.
The steady state condition for unemployment in sector 1 (u1) is
(a+ s1)u1 = q1n1 + (1− xn)hn2 + xaa, (3)
where q1 is the exogenously given quit rate from regular employment and s1 the
endogenously determined probability of getting a job in sector 1. A fraction xn
of workers who moves from sector 2 to sector 1 finds a regular job and a fraction
1 − xn becomes a search a job seeker in sector 1. The LHS is the outflow from
unemployment in sector 1 and the RHS the inflow into regular employment.
The condition for constant adult employment (n1) is
(a+ q1)n1 = s1u1 + xnhn2. (4)
The LHS is the outflows from regular employment and the RHS the inflows into
regular employment.
I let mi denote the total labour force in sector i, i.e. mi = ni + ui. From (1) -
(4), the labour force in both sectors can be expressed:
m1 = xa +
1
a
hn2, (5)
m2 = 1− xa −
1
a
hn2. (6)
As can be seen from (5) and (6), m1 and m2 depend on the labour flow from non-
regular employment to sector 1, i.e. hn2. Workers who have a non-regular job
can move from the non-regular sector to the regular sector in this model. Namely,
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the total labour force in both sectors depends on non-regular employment (n2).
Diﬀerentiating (5) and (6) w.r.t. n2 gives dm1/dn2 = h/a > 0 and dm2/dn2 =
−h/a < 0. A rise in non-regular employment (n2) increases the total labour force
in sector 1 and decreases the total labour force in sector 2. A rise in n2 implies an
increase in job seekers in the regular job sector.
2.2 Determination of wages and employment
The employment schedules are derived from the ordinary profit-maximising behav-
iour of firms. F identical firms in sector i produce a homogenous good through a
decreasing-return-to-scale technology: y∗i = Ai (n
∗
i )
α
, where 0 < α < 1, y∗i and n∗i
are the output and employment in each firm of sector i, respectively. Ai represents
productivity in sector i, where A1 > A2. The relative price of the products is as-
sumed to be given by the international market, and is normalised to unity. Each
firm in sector 1 maximises its profit, π∗i = y∗i − (1 + τ pi)w∗i n∗i , where w∗i is the real
wage in each firm in sector i and τ pi is the payroll tax rate. The first-order condition
gives w∗i = (1 + τ pi)
−1 αAi (n∗i )
α−1. Since n∗1 = n1/F and w
∗
1 = w1 in a symmetrical
equilibrium, the aggregate labour-demand schedule in sector 1 can be written:
wi = Bi
µ
1
1 + τ pi
¶
nα−1i , (7)
where Bi = αAiF 1−α > 0. Since dwi/dni < 0 and d2wi/dn2i < 0, the labour-demand
curves in both sectors are downward-sloping and convex (see the LDi-schedule in
Figure 2). The labour-demand elasticity is constant and equal to 1/ (1− α). More-
over, as can be seen from (7), a rise in the payroll tax decreases the labour demand.
I now turn to the wage-setting schedule in sector 1. I shall assume there to be
firm-specific unions so that one union is associated with each firm in sector 1. Like in
Manning (1991, 1993), each union attempts to maximise the union utility function
(z∗):
z∗(t) = n
∗
1(t)
£
Ω∗n1(t) − Ωu1(t)
¤
,
where Ω∗n1 is the discounted value of employment in each firm of sector 1, Ωu1 is the
discounted value of unemployment in sector 1, and t is a time subscript. Ωu1 also
represents the expected value of the alternative to workers losing their jobs, since all
workers who lose their jobs enter the unemployment pool in the same sector. Thus
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Figure 2: Labour market equilibrium
the bracket in the RHS represents the rent from employment. The union maximises
the total rent for employed workers.
Workers are assumed to be risk neutral, so that an individual’s instantaneous
utility function, V , can be written as V (I) = I, where I is the after-tax income.
I normalise the value of leaving the labour market to zero. Thus, the value of
employment in each firm in sector 1 is
Ω∗n1(t) =
1
1 + r
£
(1− τ e)w∗1(t) + q1Ωu1(t+1) + (1− a− q1)Ω∗n1(t+1)
¤
, (8)
where τ e is an income tax rate. The probability of an employed individual in sector
1 also being employed in this sector in the next period is 1−a−q1, which is assumed
to be positive.
The value of being unemployed in sector 1 is
Ωu1(t) =
1
1 + r
£
bu1(t) + s1Ωn1(t+1) + (1− a− s1)Ωu1(t+1)
¤
, (9)
where bui is the unemployment benefit in sector i. The probability of a job seeker
in sector 1 remaining a job seeker in this sector also in the next period is 1− a− s1,
and this probability is assumed to positive.
The wage, w∗1(t), is set so as to maximise a Nash bargain where the fall-back
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position of both the union and the firm is zero, i.e.
max
w∗
1(t)
Ψ =
£
z∗(t)
¤β £
π∗1(t)
¤1−β
,
where β is the bargaining power of the union. Like Manning (1993), I assume wages
to be determined for one period only. Hence, the current wage, w∗1(t), will not aﬀect
the values of future employment in the firm and future unemployment, i.e. Ω∗n1(t+1)
and Ωu1(t+1). As I shall be analysing a steady state, I can drop all time subscripts.
Since w∗1(t) = w1 in a symmetric equilibrium, the first-order condition gives
w1 =
µ
1
1− τ e
¶ ∙
(1 + r)μ
(1 + r)μ− (a+ r + q1 + s1)
¸
bu1 , (10)
where μ = η
N
+ [(1− β) /β] ηπ. ηN and ηπ are the elasticities of employment
and profits, respectively, w.r.t. the wage in each firm, i.e. η
N
= 1/ (1− α) and
ηπ = α/ (1− α). Hence, parameter μ can be treated as exogenous. I assume the
replacement ratio to be constant and the same in both sectors, i.e., bui/wi = ρ.
Taking (4) and (5) into account, the wage-setting relationship in sector 1 can be
expressed as
n1 =
⎡
⎣
μ (1 + r)
³
1− 1
1−τeρ
´
− (a+ r + q1)
μ (1 + r)
³
1− 1
1−τeρ
´
− r
⎤
⎦m1 + xnhn2. (11)
Equation (11) implies that the wage-setting schedule in sector 1 is vertical for the
given m1 and n2 in the wage-employment plan (see the WS1-schedule in Figure 2).
Employment is a function of the total labour force in the sector and non-regular
employment.
The wage in sector 2 (w2) is assumed to be given at the same legislated minimum
wage level for all future periods, i.e.
w2 = wm, (12)
where wm is the legislated minimumwage (see the horizontalWS2-schedule in Figure
2)1.
1 It seems to be a stylised fact that employment varies less for regular employment than for
non-regular (Labour Economic White Paper, 2007 ). A simple way of capturing this stylised fact is
to assume a vertical wage-setting schedule for workers in regular jobs and a horizontal wage-setting
schedule for workers in non-regular jobs.
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2.3 The present values of various states
The present values of being employed and unemployed in sector 1 are explicitly
derived from (8) and (9) as
Ωn1 = w1
∙
(1− τ e) (a+ r + s1) + q1ρ
(a+ r) (a+ r + q1 + s1)
¸
, (13)
Ωu1 = w1
∙
(1− τ e) s1 + (a+ r + q1) ρ
(a+ r) (a+ r + q1 + s1)
¸
. (14)
The present value of being employed in sector 2 (Ωn2(t)) is expressed as
Ωn2(t) =
1
1 + r
"
(1− τ e)wm + xnhΩn1(t+1) + (1− xn)hΩu1(t+1) + q2Ωu2(t+1)
+(1− a− h− q2)Ωn2(t+1)
#
,
(15)
where Ωu2(t) is the discounted value of being unemployed in sector 2 at time t. The
probability of an employed individual in sector 2 being employed in this sector in
the next period is 1− a− h− q2, which is assumed to be positive.
A employed worker in sector 2 can find a job with probability s2. The probability
of an unemployed worker in sector 2 remaining a job seeker in the next period is
1−a−s2, which is assumed to be positive. The value of being unemployed in sector
2 at time t (Ωu2(t)) can be written as
Ωu2(t) =
1
1 + r
£
s2Ωn2(t+1) + (1− a− s2)Ωu2(t+1)
¤
. (16)
It follows from (14), (16), (17) and the assumption of a steady state that
Ωn2 =
a+ r + s2
(a+ r + s2) (a+ r + h) + (a+ r) q2
"
(1− τ e)wm
+hw1
(1−τe)[s1−(a+r)xn]+[a+r+q1−(a+r)xn]ρ
(a+r)(a+r+q1+s1)
#
,
(17)
Ωu2 =
s2
(a+ r + s2) (a+ r + h) + (a+ r) q2
"
(1− τ e)wm
+hw1
(1−τe)[s1−(a+r)xn]+[a+r+q1−(a+r)xn]ρ
(a+r)(a+r+q1+s1)
#
.
(18)
2.4 The budget constraint
The government decides the payroll tax rate (τ pi). The income tax rate (τ e) is
determined by the balanced budget requirement. It is assumed that payroll taxes
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are levied on employers and employed workers pay the income tax. For simplicity,
I assume that the total expenditure is fixed as E. The income tax rate (τ e) is
determined in order to satisfy the following relationship.
τ p1n1w1 + τ p2n2wm + τ e (n1w1 + n2wm) = E. (19)
The LHS in (19) is the revenue and RHS is the expenditure.
2.5 Equilibrium
There are 15 exogenous variables: the labour market policy variable, i.e. the payroll
tax rates τ pi; the transfer rate from the non-regular job sector. to the regular
job sector h; the probability to find a regular job for transferred workers from the
non-regular job sector to the regular job sector xn, the replacement ratio, ρ; the
productivity parameters, Ai; the other ‘technical’ parameters; a, q1, q2, r, α, β; and
the ‘scale’ variable, F .
There are 12 endogenous variables in the model: n1, n2, u1, u2, m1, m2, s1, s2,
w1, w2, bu1 and τ e, which are all simultaneously determined. The core variables, w1,
w2, n1 and n2, are determined by (7), (11), (12)2. The other variables, i.e. u1, u2,
m1, m2, s1 and s2, are given by (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) and (6). The unemployment
benefits, i.e. bu1 is given by the assumption of a constant replacement ratio. The
income tax rate, τ e, is provided by (19).
Figure 2 illustrates the general-equilibrium solution of the model. Wages are
measured along the vertical axis and employment along the horizontal axis. The
negatively sloped labour-demand curves in the two sectors are given by (7). The
vertical wage-setting schedule in sector 1 for the given m1 is derived from (11). The
horizontal wage-setting relation in sector 2 is given by (12). In this diagram, the
equilibrium for sector 1 is E1 and E2 for sector 2. As can be seen from (7), (11)
and (12), on the one hand, the equilibrium in sector 1 depends on the payroll tax
rate(τ p1) and the income tax (τ e). On the other hand, the equilibrium in sector 2
depends on the payroll tax (τ p2) only.
2Note that (7) represents two equations.
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3 Comparative statics
I shall examine the eﬀects of a change in the payroll tax (τ pi), which is the labour
market policy parameter decided by the government. First, I shall investigate the
eﬀects of a change in the payroll tax in the regular job sector (sector 1) when the
payroll tax is not levied in the non-regular job (sector 2), i.e., the eﬀect of a change
in τ p1 when τ p2 = 0. Second, I shall investigate the case when the government
introduces the payroll tax in the non-regular job sector.
3.1 Eﬀects of a change in τ p1
As can be seen from (7), (11) and (12), a change in τ p1 has no impact on the
wage, employment, unemployment in sector 2, i.e., dwm/dτ p1 = 0 , dn2/dτ p1 =
0, and du2/dτ p1 = 0. Moreover, it follows from (5) and (6) that dm1/dτ p1 =
(h/a) (dn2/dτ p1) = 0 and dm2/dτ p1 = − (h/a) (dn2/dτ p1) = 0. Namely, the total
labour force in both sectors are not influenced by a change in τ p1 . The eﬀect on
regular employment is derived from (7) (11) and (19) as
dn1
dτ p1
=
h
n1 −
³
1
n1
´³
τp1
1+τp1
´i
θw1
n1w1 + n2wm − τ eαw1θ
> 0, (20)
where θ = [μρ (1 + r) (a+ q1)m1]
h
μ (1 + r)
³
1− 1
1−τeρ
´
− r
i−2
(1− τ e)−2 > 0. A
rise in the payroll tax in sector 1 increases regular employment. The reason is the
following. A rise in the payroll tax increases the tax revenue and this implies a
decrease in the income tax rate (τ e) under the assumption that the tax expenditure
is fixed and constant. As can be seen from (7), on the one hand, a rise in τ p1 shifts the
labour demand schedule downwards in sector 1 and this tends to decrease the labour
demand for regular jobs. On the other hand, a fall in the income tax rate shifts
the wage-setting schedule in sector 1 rightwards and this tends to increase regular
employment. The eﬀect via τ p1 and the eﬀect via τ e work in opposite directions.
However, (20) shows that the net eﬀect on regular employment is positive. This is
illustrated in Figure 3. A rise in τ p1 shifts the demand schedule in sector 1 (LD1)
downwards and the wage-setting schedule in sector 1 rightwards. The equilibrium
for sector 1 moves from E1 to E∗1 . The wage for regular jobs is decreased and thus
regular employment increases. This is diﬀerent from many earlier studies. Many
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Figure 3: The eﬀects of an increase in τ p1
earlier studies pointed out that a rise in the payroll tax may decrease employment
because a rise in the payroll tax implies an increase in the total labour cost for
employers. However, this is not the case in my model. The reason is that a rise in
τ p1 induces a fall in the income tax rate and this positive impact on employment is
much greater than the negative eﬀects via τ p1. As a result, employment tends to be
increased by a rise in τ p1 .
It follows from (20) and dm1/dτ p1 = 0 that the eﬀect on unemployment in sector
1 can be written as
du1
dτ p1
=
dm1
dτ p1
− dn1
dτ p1
< 0.
This shows that unemployment in sector 1 is decreased by a rise in τ p1. Since a
change in τ p1 has no impact on unemployment in sector 2, aggregate unemployment
is decreased by an increase in τ p1.
To sum up, a rise in τ p1 increases regular employment and decreases aggregate
unemployment. However, a change in τ p1 has no impact on the non-regular job
sector.
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3.2 Eﬀects of an introduction of τ p2
As can be seen from (7) and (12), an introduction of τ p2 aﬀects non-regular employ-
ment via the labour demand schedule in sector 2.
The eﬀect of an introduction of τ p2 on non-regular employment is derived from
(7) and (12) as
dn2
dτ p2
¯¯¯¯
τp2=0
= − n2
1− α < 0. (21)
An introduction of the payroll tax in the non-regular job sector decreases non-
regular employment. This is illustrated in Figure 4. An introduction of τ p2 shifts
the demand curve in sector 2 (LD2) downwards. The equilibrium for sector 2 moves
from E2 to E∗2 . Non-regular employment is decreased from n2 to n
∗
2.
It follows from (5), (6) and (21) that the eﬀects on the total labour force in both
sectors are
dm1
dτ p2
¯¯¯¯
τp2=0
=
µ
h
a
¶
dn2
dτ p2
¯¯¯¯
τp2=0
< 0, (22)
dm2
dτ p2
¯¯¯¯
τp2=0
= −
µ
h
a
¶
dn2
dτ p2
¯¯¯¯
τp2=0
> 0. (23)
An introduction of τ p2 decreases the total labour force in the regular job sector and
increases the total labour force in the non-regular job sector. As can be seen from
Figure 1, a fall in non-regular employment implies a decrease in the labour flow from
sector 2 to sector 1. Thus the total labour force in sector 1 decreases.
It follows from (21) and (23) that the eﬀect on unemployment in sector 2 is
du2
dτ p2
¯¯¯¯
τp2=0
=
dm2
dτ p2
¯¯¯¯
τp2=0
− dn2
dτ p2
¯¯¯¯
τp2=0
> 0.
This shows that an introduction of the payroll tax in the non-regular job sector
increases unemployment in the sector.
The eﬀect on regular employment is derived from (7) (11), (19), and (22) as
dn1
dτ p2
¯¯¯¯
τp2=0
=
n2wm
¡
1−τe−α
1−α
¢
θ
n1w1 + n2wm −
³
τp1
1−τe
´
αw1θ
−
⎡
⎣1 + α
h
− a+ q1
μ (1 + r)
³
1− 1
1−τeρ
´
− r
⎤
⎦ ≶ 0.
(24)
The first term in the RHS represents the positive eﬀect on regular employment
via the income tax (τ e). An introduction of the payroll tax in the non-regular job
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Figure 4: The eﬀects of an introduction of τ p2
sector increases the tax revenue. Since the tax expenditure is assumed to be fixed
and constant, the income tax tends to decrease. This eﬀect shifts the wage-setting
schedule rightwards and the regular employment tends to increase. The second
term in the RHS is the negative eﬀect on regular employment via the labour flow
from sector 2 to sector 1. As can be seen from (7), an introduction of the payroll
tax in sector 2 tends to decrease the labour demand in the sector. Since the wage
in the sector is assumed to be given by the legislated minimum wage, non-regular
employment is decreased by an introduction of τ p2. A fall in non-regular employment
implies a decrease in the labour flow into sector 1 and this tends to shifts the wage-
setting schedule in sector 1 leftwards. The second term tends to decrease regular
employment. These two eﬀects work in the opposite direction. In general, the net
eﬀect is ambiguous.
Figure 3 illustrates the case that the eﬀect via the first term dominates the ef-
fect via the second term, i.e., the wage-setting schedule in sector 1 (WS1) is shifted
rightwards. An introduction of τ p2 shifts the demand curve in sector 2 (LD2) down-
wards. The equilibrium for sector 2 moves from E2 to E∗2 . Non-regular employment
is decreased from n2 to n∗2.
If the wage-setting schedule in sector 1 (WS1) is shifted leftwards, an introduction
of τ p2 induces a decrease both in regular employment and non-regular employment.
14
Namely, an introduction of τ p2 decreases aggregate employment in the economy.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper has analysed the general equilibrium eﬀects of the payroll taxes. First, I
investigate the case when the government changes the payroll tax that is levied only
in the regular job sector. Second, I analyse the case when the government introduces
the payroll tax in the non-regular job sector.
When the government raises the payroll tax in regular job sector, the income tax
is decreased because the tax expenditure is assumed to be fixed and constant in the
model. On the one hand, a rise in the payroll tax shifts the labour demand schedule
downwards in the sector and this tends to decrease the labour demand for regular
jobs. On the other hand, a fall in the income tax rate shifts the wage-setting schedule
in the regular job sector rightwards and this tends to increase regular employment.
The net eﬀect on regular employment is positive. Namely, a rise in the payroll
tax in the regular job sector increases regular employment. Since a change in the
payroll tax in the regular job sector has no impact on the non-regular job sector
in the model, an increase in regular employment implies a decrease in aggregate
unemployment. If the wage in the non-regular job sector depends on the income
tax, a fall in the income tax increases non regular employment. This implies an
increase in the labour flow into the regular job sector and thus the regular job sector
becomes more competitive. As a result, regular employment increases further.
When the government introduces the payroll tax in the non-regular job sector,
non-regular employment deceases because a rise in the payroll tax implies a rise in
the labour costs for non-regular jobs. A fall in non-regular employment decreases
the labour flow into the regular job sector and thus the regular job sector becomes
less competitive. This tends to raise the wage and decrease employment there.
However, an introduction of the payroll tax in the non-regular job sector decreases
the income tax. This tends to increase regular employment. The net eﬀect on
regular employment is ambiguous because these two eﬀects work in the opposite
directions. If regular jobs and non-regular jobs are substitutes, an introduction in
the payroll tax for non-regular jobs implies that the labour costs for regular jobs
becomes relatively cheaper. As a result, regular employment may increase and non-
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regular employment may decrease in the economy.
References
[1] Blanchard, O. J. and S. Fischer, 1989, Lectures on Macroeconomics (The MIT
Press).
[2] Blanchflower, D and A. Oswald, 1994, The Wage Curve (The MIT Press, Cam-
bridge, MA).
[3] Calmfors, L., 1996, Den aktiva arbetsmarknadspolitiken och sysselsättingen - en
teoretisk referensram, Aktiv Arbetsmarknadspolitik (Statens Oﬀentliga Utred-
ningar 1996:34).
[4] Fitoussi, J.-P., 2000, Payroll Tax Reduction for the Low Paid, OECD Economic
Studies 31, Paris.
[5] Fukushima, Y., 1998, Active Labour Market Programmes and Unemployment
in a Dual Labour Market, Research Papers in Economics 1998:2, Stockholm
University.
[6] Fukushima, Y., 2001, Active Labour Market Programmes, Education and Un-
employment, Research Papers in Economics 2001:11, Stockholm University.
[7] Fukushima, Y., 2003, Essays on Employment Policies, Dissertations in Eco-
nomics 2003:1, Stockholm University.
[8] Goerke, L. , 2000, Labour Taxation, Eﬃciency Wages and the Long Run, Bul-
letin of Economic Research 52.
[9] Goerke, L. , 2002, Statutory and Economic Incidence of Labour Taxes, Applied
Economics Letters 9.
[10] Hamermesh, D., 1993, Labor Demand (Princeton University Press).
[11] Layard, R., S. Nickell and R. Jackman, 1991, Unemployment (Oxford University
Press).
[12] Lindbeck, A., 1993, Unemployment and Macroeconomics (The MIT Press).
[13] Lindbeck, A., 1995, The Swedish Experiment (SNS Förlag).
[14] Manning, A. 1991, The Determinants of Wage Pressure: Some Implications of
a Dynamic Model, Economica 58.
[15] Manning, A. 1993, Wage Bargaining and the Phillips Curve: The Identification
and Specification of Aggregate Wage Equations, Economic Journal 103.
16
[16] Ministry of Health, Labour andWelfare, 2005,White paper on Labour Economy,
Tokyo, Japan.
[17] Ministry of Health, Labour andWelfare, 2006,White paper on Labour Economy,
Tokyo, Japan.
[18] Ministry of Health, Labour andWelfare, 2007,White paper on Labour Economy,
Tokyo, Japan.
[19] OECD, 1990, Labour Market Policies for the 1990s, Paris.
[20] OECD, 2004, Employment Outlook, Paris.
[21] OECD, 2005, Employment Outlook, Paris.
[22] OECD, 2006, Employment Outlook, Paris.
[23] Orszag, J. M. and D. Snower, 1999, Youth Unemployment and Government
Policy, Journal of Population Economics 12.
17
